Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in Saint Petersburg, Russia June 7, 2024.
Anton Vaganov | Reuters
Russia has again hinted that it’s making changes to its official stance on the use of nuclear weapons, amid Ukraine’s continuing incursion into its Kursk border region.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said Sunday that Russia is in the process of amending its nuclear doctrine, which sets out the conditions in which nuclear weapons can be used, because of what Russia sees as a Western-backed “escalation” of the war with Ukraine.
Russia accused the West of encouraging Ukraine’s cross-border raid that has seen its forces seize almost 500 square miles of Russian territory since it began on Aug. 6. Ukraine’s NATO allies deny having any prior knowledge of the operation, or any hand in its offensive.
Speaking to Russian state media agency TASS on Sunday, Ryabkov said work was “at an advanced stage” to amend Russia’s nuclear doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons.
“There is a clear direction to make adjustments, which are also conditioned by the study and analysis of the experience of conflict development in recent years, including … everything related to the escalation course of our Western opponents in connection with the SVO [special military operation],” Ryabkov said, referring to Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine.
Ryabkov did not specify when any changes would be finalized, saying, “the time for completing this work is a rather difficult question, given that we are talking about the most important aspects of ensuring our national security,” he said, in comments translated by Google.
Conditions of use
Russian saber-rattling over the use of nuclear weapons is nothing new but Ryabkov’s comments, which echo recent statements made by senior officials and the Kremlin, point to Russia preparing the ground for changes to state policy regarding the conditions in which it would be acceptable to use nuclear weapons.
Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory, and its targeting of military facilities and infrastructure using Western-supplied weaponry, particularly in the case of long-range missiles, has also upped the ante as to whether Moscow would consider using nuclear weapons to defend its own territory.
As it stands, Russia’s nuclear doctrine states that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.”
The Yars ballistic missiles take part in a rehearsal of the Victory Day parade in Moscow, Russia, May 7, 2022.
Bai Xueqi | Xinhua News Agency | Getty Images
Other conditions that could determine the use of nuclear weapons by Russia include the “receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies,” as well as “the enemy’s impact on critically important state or military facilities,” according to a Google translation of the document.
In its 2020 policy, Russia nonetheless described nuclear weapons as “a means of deterrence,” the use of which being “an extreme and necessary measure.” Russia referred to its nuclear doctrine as “defensive in nature” and said it “takes all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent the aggravation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones.”
Since Russia invaded Ukraine in Feb. 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reiterated the message that Moscow would not hesitate to deploy such weapons if its own territorial integrity and sovereignty were threatened.
In May, Russia held tactical nuclear weapons drills near the Ukraine border and it has also stationed such weapons within the territory of its ally, Belarus.
Military vehicles of Russia’s Leningrad military district units drive along a road during the second stage of tactical nuclear drills of the armed forces of Russia and Belarus at an undisclosed location, in this still image from video released June 12, 2024.
Russian Defence Ministry | Via Reuters
Tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons are designed for use on the battlefield and are able to erase specific targets, such as military bases or training centers.
While they are less devastating than strategic nuclear weapons that can wipe out entire cities, the deployment of such weapons would represent a serious escalation in the war, and foster concerns of a direct confrontation with the West.
Putin has also signalled his willingness to change the conditions in which such weapons could be used, stating in June that the country’s nuclear doctrine was a “living instrument” that could be changed.
“We should clarify what constitutes the use or non-use [of nuclear weapons], as well as specific scenarios in which they can be used. We have a nuclear doctrine, and everything is laid out there … It states clearly: nuclear weapons can be used only in exceptional cases – when there is a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, in exceptional circumstances,” Putin said, addressing the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June.
“I do not believe that this moment has come – there is no such need. However, this doctrine is a living instrument, and we are closely monitoring developments in the world around us, and we do not rule out the possibility of making changes to this doctrine,” Putin added.
Incursion urgency
Russia has appeared to be priming its domestic and global audience for changes to its state policy on the use of nuclear weapons since Ukraine launched an ambitious cross-border raid into the Kursk border region of Russia almost a month ago.
In August, Russia’s foreign minister, his deputy and the Kremlin’s spokesperson all stated that changes will soon be announced.
As such, there are questions marks over whether Russia could be preparing to deploy nuclear weapons against Ukraine in its urgency to respond to an operation that has embarrassed the Kremlin, and laid bare weaknesses in Russia’s national defenses.
“Russian military doctrine has always justified the use of nuclear weapons if Russia’s territorial integrity is threatened. The scope for Russian retaliation is pretty unlimited,” David Roche, president of Quantum Strategy, said in analysis in August.
Describing Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk as a “game changer,” Roche added that the operation could make nuclear confrontation more likely as it “vitiates NATO’s efforts to avoid ‘escalation.'”
“By invading Russia, Ukraine has destroyed most of the lower rungs on the escalation ladder that the Alliance, and the U.S. in particular, sought to preserve,” he noted.
A soldier fixes a drone underground in a Ukrainian military position, and former Russian military position, in Ukrainian-controlled territory on August 18th 2024, in Kursk, Russia. Ukrainian forces operating in Russia’s Kursk Region have destroyed a second key bridge, the commander of the Ukrainian Air Force said, as they attempt to push further into Russia.
The Washington Post | The Washington Post | Getty Images
Despite its own unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in Feb. 2022, Russia has positioned the war as an existential battle, accusing the West of backing Ukraine in a bid to destroy Russia. Ukraine’s Western allies in NATO refute the claim, saying ongoing military aid for Kyiv is to defend the country’s territorial sovereignty and independence.
Ukrainian officials have expressed hopes that the incursion, and crossing one of the Kremlin’s so-called “red lines,” will dispel Western fears that Putin could resort to using nuclear weapons — and could encourage more NATO allies to approve the use of longer-range missiles against targets within Russia.
Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War played down Ryabkov’s comments, stating Sunday evening that “Russian officials continue to engage in rote nuclear saber-rattling in an effort to encourage the West to self-deter and reduce its support for Ukraine.”
“Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on September 1 that Russia will change its nuclear doctrine based on recent conflicts and the West’s alleged escalation in Ukraine but noted that there are no set dates for the changes,” the ISW noted in its analysis, adding:
“Ryabkov did not specify what the alleged changes to the doctrine may be, and ISW continues to assess that Russia remains highly unlikely to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine or engage in nuclear confrontation elsewhere.”
